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Abstract
Introduction: Ghana introduced capitation payment under National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS), beginning
with pilot in the Ashanti region, in 2012 with a key objective of controlling utilization and related cost. This study
sought to analyse utilization and claims expenditure data before and after introduction of capitation payment
policy to understand whether the intended objective was achieved.
Methods: The study was cross-sectional, using a non-equivalent pre-test and post-test control group design. We
did trend analysis, comparing utilization and claims expenditure data from three administrative regions of Ghana,
one being an intervention region and two being control regions, over a 5-year period, 2010–2014. We performed
multivariate analysis to determine differences in utilization and claims expenditure between the intervention and
control regions, and a difference-in-differences analysis to determine the effect of capitation payment on utilization
and claims expenditure in the intervention region.
Results: Findings indicate that growth in outpatient utilization and claims expenditure increased in the pre capitation
period in all three regions but slowed in post capitation period in the intervention region. The linear regression analysis
showed that there were significant differences in outpatient utilization (p = 0.0029) and claims expenditure (p = 0.0003)
between the intervention and the control regions before implementation of the capitation payment. However, only
claims expenditure showed significant difference (p = 0.0361) between the intervention and control regions after the
introduction of capitation payment. A difference-in-differences analysis, however, showed that capitation payment had
a significant negative effect on utilization only, in the Ashanti region (p < 0.007). Factors including availability of district
hospitals and clinics were significant predictors of outpatient health care utilization.
Conclusion: We conclude that outpatient utilization and related claims expenditure increased in both pre and post
capitation periods, but the increase in post capitation period was at slower rate, suggesting that implementation of
capitation payment yielded some positive results. Health policy makers in Ghana may, therefore, want to consider
capitation a key provider payment method for primary outpatient care in order to control cost in health care delivery.
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Background
The World Health Organisation (WHO) [1] has noted that
as many as 11% of the population in some countries incur
catastrophic expenditures on health each year while about
5% are pushed into poverty; and only about 5–10% of
people living in Sub- Sahara Africa and southern Asia are
covered by any type of formal social protection compared
with 20–60% in middle income countries. In response to
this global challenge, Ghana introduced a national health
insurance scheme (NHIS) in 2003 to provide financial risk
protection for its population [2]. About 95% of the diseases
in Ghana are covered by the health insurance scheme. The
Scheme achieved 38% population coverage in 2013 [3] and
by end of year 2016, the population coverage stood at 39%
of projected national population [NHIA Annual Report,
2016. Unpublished]. The NHIS policy makes provision for
several groups of people to be exempted from payment of
premium. These include children under 18 years old, eld-
erly above 70 years old, Social Security and National Insur-
ance Trust (SSNIT) pensioners, pregnant women, and
those identified as indigent (extreme poor). Sources of
funding for the NHIS include the National Health Insur-
ance Levy of 2.5%, a 2.5% of formal sector workers’ contri-
butions to the SSNIT Fund, return on investment,
premium paid by non-SSNIT contributors and registration
fees. In the years 2009–2011 the NHIS experienced in-
creasing expenditure over income [4], confirming predic-
tion by an actuarial team who cautioned in 2005 that with
an anticipated increase in membership enrolment and re-
sultant utilization of health care services under the NHIS,
if the funding level remained constant, expenditure would
outstrip income by the year 2010 [5], a situation which has
been partly attributed to both supply and demand side
moral hazards [6]. The National Health Insurance Author-
ity (NHIA) commits to address this challenge through pro-
vider payment reforms with the view to containing cost
while asuring quality of care. This decision syncs with evi-
dence in literature which indicates that one key motivation
for provider payment reforms in countries’ health system is
the need for countries to improve efficiency in the applica-
tion of health care resource in order to contain cost escal-
ation without compromising quality [7–9]. Economic
theory, however, points to the fact that changes in provider
payment methods elicits responses from health care pro-
viders that could negatively affect the quality and quantity
of service they provide [10, 11].
Key payment methods applied in countries’ health sys-
tem include, but not limited to, fee-for-service (FFS),
diagnosis-related-groupings (DRG) and capitation pay-
ments. FFS payment is used to reimburse health care
providers based on item of service they provide and it
aligns provider income to quantity of service provided
[12]. Associated with supplier-induced demand [13], FFS
is described as reward for “volume and intensity rather
than value”; and “inflationary and ineffective in contain-
ing cost” [14] as it create incentives to increase service
provision and pushes the financial risk to the payer. Ac-
cording to Rosen, FFS helps generate valuable health in-
formation needed to guide clinical decisions and argues
that when providers advise patients in their capacity as
agents in care delivery, their influence on patients’ actions
may only be described as “physician-initiated” demand
and not necessarily supplier-induced demand [15]. FFS is
widely used in countries such as Belgium, Germany and
Japan [16] as well as in many low and middle-income
countries. There are, however, moves by countries to
adopt the DRG payment as part of measures to address
the negative incentives that FFS payment creates [17]. The
DRG, on its part, relates diagnosis and treatment to cost
and providers are paid a pre-determined rate for services
rendered based on illness episode with the initial motiv-
ation to provide framework for monitoring quality of care
and utilization [18]. It has strong incentive to induce effi-
ciency and cost-containment but requires quality control
and monitoring systems to avert any possible perverse in-
centives [16]. DRG was introduced by the United States
Medicare programme to contain an observed increasing
health care expenditure [19] and a number of low and
middle-income countries, including Ghana, have adopted
various forms of DRG methods to reimburse their health
care providers [17]. The advantages of DRG notwithstand-
ing, it offers incentives for providers to give patients a
more severe diagnosis to attract a higher reimbursement
[20]. Currently, many countries combine it with other
forms of payment method including capitation payment.
Under capitation payment, providers are paid agreed sum
of money per listed patient for a period of time to provide
pre-determined services for them, with the expectation
that capitation payment will promote efficiency in the use
of scarce health care resources by controlling volumes of
services provided and related cost. Under capitation pay-
ment system, both payers and providers of health care ser-
vices have the benefit of knowing their budgets in
advance. The literature has it that, capitation payment
helps to eliminate supplier-induced demand associated
with fee-for-service payment [12, 15] but also cautions
that unless the capitated rate is risk-adjusted, at least by
age and sex, providers may provide less care for perceived
risk groups on their list [16, 21].
Provider payment methods within the NHIS
In 2005, the NHIA adopted FFS payment system to re-
imburse its credentialed providers but had to introduce
a Ghana version of DRG which became known as
Ghana-Diagnosis-Related Grouping (G-DRG) system in
2008 with the view to containing observed escalating
cost that was being experienced under the FFS payment
system. The G-DRG method was implemented nationwide
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and at all levels of care. It is used to pay for both outpa-
tients (OPD) and inpatients (IPD) services while FFS con-
tinues to be used to pay for medicines. Under the G-DRG,
related diagnoses are grouped together and the average
price of care is determined. The switch from FFS to
G-DRG was done without any study by the NHIA to
understand the underlying causes of the effects of FFS.
Likewise, the G-DRG was introduced without any pilot,
neither was it subjected to prospective evaluation to assess
it’s likely outcome regarding the cost-containment object-
ive for which it was being introduced. Consequently, the
G-DRG was later observed to have rather contributed to
cost escalation, more than tripling the cost of claims ob-
served under the FFS. OPD attendance on account of
health insurance increased from 597,859 in 2005 to
25,486,081 in 2011. This translates into claims expend-
iture of GHC7.6 m ($3.53 m) in 2005 and GHC548.7 m
($255.2 m) in 2011. Between 2007 and 2009, the average
outpatient claims cost increased by nearly 50% from
GHC6.93 (US$2.80) to GHC10.11 (US$4.21), and in 2010,
outpatient claims accounted for 70% of total claims re-
ceived by NHIA. This represented 30% of total costs of
claims paid by NHIA. Thus, growth in utilization trans-
lates into growth in claims cost and whereas one may ac-
knowledge that the growth in service utilization may be
due to the yearly growth in membership and the removal
of financial barrier to accessing health care service, it is also
not certain whether this phenomenon is a genuine one and
that, it is not partly due to moral hazard which is associ-
ated with social health insurance schemes world-wide. This
concern stems from the observation made over the years
during claims processing. It has been noticed with concern
that overbilling of medicines, inappropriate application of
tariff, duplication of claims, lack of diagnostic evidence to
back claims, absence of linkage between treatment and
diagnosis and treatment outside the defined benefits pack-
age are some of the provider-side moral hazards found
with claims submitted by service providers for settlement
by the NHIA. Further to that, clinical audit activities also
revealed irrational prescription of medicines, inflation of
quantities of medicine supplied to subscribers, provision of
services above accreditation level and overbilling of medi-
cines as some of the issues found with claims submitted by
providers to the NHIA for payment. Between 2010 and
2012 an amount of GHC20.103, 976 ($9,307,396)) was
found to have been paid as un-earned claims to providers,
partly as a result of the afore-mentioned provider-side
moral hazards [3]. The Ministry of Health Joint Assess-
ment Team that conducted a holistic assessment of the
Ghana Health Sector Programme of Work, 2012 also
noted that since its introduction, the NHIS has led to in-
crease in utilization of OPD services across all the regions.
The team, however, raised concern that “with the backdrop
of doubling OPD per capita rate, 80% of total outpatients
being NHIS-insured members and 34% of the population
being active NHIS members, the high proportion of OPD
attendance could either be a reflection of frivolous use of
services by NHIS members or a reflection of high NHIS
membership among those in need of services” and con-
cluded that “a positive answer to these questions poses a fi-
nancial risk to NHIS, and that these issues should be
further analysed and addressed” [22].
Thinking through solutions to address these chal-
lenges, the NHIA decided to introduce capitation pay-
ment for primary outpatient services as part of its
provider payment reforms, beginning with a pilot in the
Ashanti region that bore the highest cost burden of
claims (28% in 2010). Although capitation payment has
been found in literature to encourage efficiency [23]:
drive down cost [24, 25], serve as critical source of in-
come for providers [26], promote adherence to guide-
lines and policies [27] and encourage providers to work
better and give health education to patients [28], it is
also noted to induce reduction in the quantity and qual-
ity of care provided [26], encourage skimming on inputs,
“dumping” of high risk patients and negatively affect
patient-provider relationship [29]. The NHIA was, how-
ever, convinced that notwithstanding any un-intended
negative effect following the introduction of capitation
payment policy, with a robust monitoring and evaluation
system, its implementation could contribute to address-
ing the cost escalation challenge that is being experi-
enced under the G-DRG and fee-for-service payment
methods. A key objective for introducing capitation pay-
ment method was to control utilization and contain cost
of claims paid by the NHIA. This study was, therefore,
undertaken to determine whether capitation payment in-
troduced in the Ashanti region of Ghana contributed in
controlling utilization and claims expenditure under the
NHIS. On the basis of a hypothesis that capitation pay-
ment will result in downward trend or slowed growth in
utilization and claims expenditure of the NHIA, we devel-
oped the following research question to guide the study:
Does capitation payment have effect on utilization of




Three regions, namely Ashanti, Volta and Central, were
purposefully selected for the study. Capitation payment
policy which is the subject of study was first introduced
in the Ashanti region in 2012 and was, therefore, se-
lected as the “intervention” region for the study. Per the
NHIA’s implementation plan, the policy was to be imple-
mented in the Volta region in 2016 and in the Central
region in 2017. This study being part of a broader moni-
toring and evaluation system designed to follow the
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implementation to identify any un-intended effects, we
purposively selected the Volta and Central regions that
were being prepared for the next implementation phase
were selected as “control” regions for this study to en-
able measurement of effect of the payment policy in
Ashanti. Details of characteristics of the three regions
are provided in Additional file 1.
Study design and data
The study was cross-sectional using a non-equivalent
pre-test and post-test control group design (before and
after study) which according to Creswell [30] is a popu-
lar approach to quasi-experiments where both the inter-
vention and control groups are selected without random
assignment. Using multiple non-equivalent comparison
groups rather than one also increases the ability to ex-
plore more threats to the causal inferences [31]. We
used aggregated secondary data on utilization and claims
expenditure from the NHIA database as validated by the
NHIA Actuarial Directorate covering the years 2010–
2014. The dataset (Additional file 2) contains district
level information on health care utilization for OPD and
IPD. Costs are also registered separately for OPD and
IPD and are both further split into service and drugs
costs. Data on the demographic and socio-economic fac-
tors were obtained from records of the Ghana Statistical
Service (GSS) [32].
Statistical data analysis
In total, data from all the 52 districts in three regions
were used for analysis: 24 in Ashanti region, 13 in Cen-
tral region and 15 in Volta region. Descriptive analysis
using Microsoft Excel 2007 was performed to examine
trends in both OPD and IPD utilization and cost in the
intervention region, Ashanti and the two control re-
gions, Central and Volta over a 5-year period, 2010–
2014. Utilization and claims expenditure per capita were
also analysed by dividing total utilization and total
claims expenditure for both OPD and IPD by the re-
spective number of NHIS members in each region. A
generalised linear regression model was performed to
determine differences in OPD utilization and claims ex-
penditure between the intervention region and the two
control regions before and after implementation of the
capitation payment system in the Ashanti region. This
model was also used to identify predictors of OPD
utilization. In addition difference-in-difference analysis
(DID) was also conducted using the total district level
OPD utilization and cost in all the three regions for each
of the study period to estimate the effect of capitation
payment system. In both multivariate analyses, the out-
come variables were OPD utilization measured in num-
ber of visits per year, and OPD costs in Ghanaian Cedi
(GHS). Costs were converted from GHS to US dollars
(USD) using historical exchange rates to correct for in-
flation. The explanatory variables were region, and
assigned a value of 1 if Ashanti, 2 if Central, and 3 if
Volta; time when the intervention started, a binary vari-
able with a value of 0 for years before 2012 and 1 for
years after 2012; treated, a binary variable with value of
0 for total OPD health care utilization in the control re-
gions, (Central and Volta) and 1 for total OPD health
care utilization in the intervention region (Ashanti); and
“did”, an interaction between time and treated variables
(effect). The dependent variables, OPD health care
utilization and OPD cost in the DID models were trans-
formed into logarithmic variables to minimize the problem
of skewness. In all the regression models, post-estimation
diagnostic checks were also conducted using variance in-
flation factor (VIF) and co-efficient correlation matrix
(Additional file 3) to address the issue of multicollinearity.
All covariates that showed VIF estimation of 3 or more
were systematically excluded from the models. The ana-
lyses were carried out using Excel version 10 and Stata




Utilization of OPD services at NHIS-credentialed facilities
in Ashanti region (intervention) doubled from 3.74 million
to 7.49 million visits between 2010 and 2011, the years be-
fore the start of implementation of capitation payment but
reduced to 4.1 million (− 44.9%) in 2012. Between the years
2013 and 2014 which follow the start date of capitation im-
plementation, utilization increased from 4.29 million to 5.02
million (17.0%) (Table 1). The two control regions, however,
exhibited contrasting patterns between them. Utilization in
the Central region increased from 1.34 million to 2.42 mil-
lion visits (80.3%) between 2010 and 2011, and also in-
creased from 1.94 million to 2.54 million visits (30.7%)
between 2013 and 2014. In the Volta region, utilization
more than doubled from 903,379 to 1.99 million visits be-
tween 2010 and 2011 but declined from 2.8 million to 2.7
million visits (0.8%) between 2013 and 2014. Results of the
generalized linear regression model showed significant dif-
ference in utilization between the intervention region and
the control regions, F (2, 49) =6.62, p= 0.0029 before imple-
mentation of capitation in 2012 (Additional file 4). However,
no significant difference in utilization was observed between
the intervention and control regions 2 years after the intro-
duction of capitation payment in the Ashanti region, 2013–
2014: F (2.49) =0.13. p= 0.8755 (Additional file 5).
Trends in costs of utilization
Table 2 showed trends in cost of utilization in all the
three regions over the 5-year study period. Claims ex-
penditure in relation to OPD utilization in Ashanti
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region increased from $49.54 million to $79.42 million
(60.3%) before the introduction of the capitation payment pol-
icy, dropped by more than half to $38.7 million in 2012 which
is the year capitation payment was introduced; and increased
again in 2013 from $51.39 million to $63.85 million (24.2%) in
2014, the years after its introduction. In the Central region,
claims expenditure related to utilization increased from
$15.95 million to $22.93 million (43.7%) between 2010 and
2011 and declined from $21.39 million to $19.53 million
(8.7%) between 2013 and 2014. Claims expenditure in the
Volta region increased from $11.08 million to $17.05 million
(53.9%) between 2010 and 2011, and from 16.31million to
20.52million (25.8%) between 2013 and 2014. The generalized
linear regression model showed significant difference in claims
expenditure between the intervention region and control re-
gions in the pre capitation period, 2010–2011, F(2, 49) = 9.65,
p=0.0003 (Additional file 6) and post capitation period,
2013–2013; F (2, 49) =3.56. p= 0.0361 (Additional file 7).
Table 1 Trends in utilization by region and service type, 2010–2014
Region Year OPD % Growth IPD % Growth Total % Growth
Ashanti 2010 3,738,374 – 132,258 – 3,870,632 –
2011 7,492,825 100.4 380,886 188.0 7,873,711 103.4
2012 4,127,229a − 44.9 334,508a − 12.2 4,461,737 −43.3
2013 4,288,590 3.9 305,893 −8.6 4,594,483 3.0
2014 5,019,149 17.0 405,719 32.6 5,424,868 18.1
Central 2010 1,344,301 – 49,490 – 1,393,791 –
2011 2,424,202a 80.3 102,484a 107.1 2,526,686 81.3
2012 1,990,644 −17.9 81,071 −20.9 2,071,715 −18.0
2013 1,940,097 −2.5 131,093 61.7 2,071,190 0.0
2014 2,535,207 30.7 125,215a − 4.5 2,660,422 28.4
Volta 2010 903,379 – 66,626 – 970,005 –
2011 1,994,868 120.8 220,441a 230.9 2,215,309 128.4
2012 1,696,435 −15.0 133,838 −39.3 1,830,273 −17.4
2013 2,754,035 62.3 229,707 71.6 2,983,741 63.0
2014 2,731,830 −0.8 173,871a − 24.3 2,905,701 −2.6
aIndicates that for these values inter- or extrapolation was used for one or more of the districts involved
Table 2 Trends in utilization cost by region and service type, 2010–2014
Region Year OPD cost (USD) IPD cost (USD) %
GrowthService Drugs Total % Growth Service Drugs Total
Ashanti 2010 23,599,737 25,935,899 49,535,636 – 4,982,751 9,435,406 14,418,157 –
2011 37,256,361 42,166,756 79,423,117 60.3% 9,307,289 4,162,678 13,469,967 −6.6%
2012 14,563,585 24,171,523 38,735,108 −51.2% 16,131,540 5,929,841 22,061,381 63.8%
2013 17,712,047 33,680,387 51,392,434 32.7% 24,467,854a 14,967,877a 39,435,731 78.8%
2014 29,917,456 33,932,201 63,849,657 24.2% 16,532,198a 8,028,462a 24,560,660 −37.7%
Central 2010 6,784,825 9,169,123 15,953,948 – 3,192,779 2,025,999 5,218,778 –
2011 9,547,133 13,380,507 22,927,640 43.7% 4,422,200 2,047,402 6,469,602 24.0%
2012 12,570,262 13,473,381 26,043,643 13.6% 5,460,789 2,149,294 7,610,083 17.6%
2013 11,035,477 10,352,074 21,387,551 −17.9% 5,907,059a 2,660,226a 8,567,285 12.6%
2014 9,047,543 10,482,119 19,529,662 −8.7% 4,415,934a 1,677,136a 6,093,070 −28.9%
Volta 2010 5,249,982 5,829,706 11,079,688 2,492,220 3,551,209 6,043,429 –
2011 8,658,245 8,396,007 17,054,252 53.9% 3,843,255 2,422,278 6,265,533 3.7%
2012 9,537,493 8,918,609 18,456,102 8.2% 6,671,738 2,617,453 9,289,191 48.3%
2013 7,902,767 8,407,392 16,310,159 −11.6% 13,806,537a 5,862,988 19,669,525 111.7%
2014 9,808,899 10,709,757 20,518,656 25.8% 11,159,415a 3,164,179a 14,323,594 −27.2%
aIndicates that for these values inter- or extrapolation was used for one or more of the districts involved
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Effect of capitation payment on utilization and cost
Result of the difference-in-differences analysis showed
that capitation payment had a negative effect on both
out-patients utilization and related claims expenditure in
the intervention region (Tables 3 and 4). The effect
was, however, significant on outpatient utilization only
(p < 0.007). The multivariate regression model revealed
that district hospital (p = 0.022) and clinic (p = 0.027) were
significant predictors of health care utilization (Table 5).
Other factors such as proportion of the population in pov-
erty, percent of urban population and availability of health




The main purpose of this study was to assess the effect
of capitation payment on the health service utilization
and related claims expenditure under Ghana’s National
Health Insurance Scheme. A key objective for the intro-
duction of capitation payment was to hold down growth
in total health care expenditure by controlling outpa-
tients’ utilization and related expenditure. Our study re-
vealed that outpatient utilization and related claims
expenditure increased in both pre and post capitation
periods. However, the growth in utilization in the inter-
vention region after the introduction of capitation pay-
ment was slower than that of pre-capitation period,
suggesting that implementation of capitation payment to
control utilization yielded some positive results for the
NHIA. This is because in 2012 when the policy was in-
troduced, a negative growth of 44.9% was experienced
and thereafter, though there was positive growth of 3.9%
in 2013 and 17% in 2014, the trend in growth was slow
compared to the period before the introduction of capi-
tation payment. It must, however, be noted that the
trend in the control regions were a bit different. While
the central region experienced negative growth of 2.5%
in 2013, the Volta region experienced a positive growth
of 62.3%; and in 2014 Central region recorded a positive
growth of 30.7% while the Volta region recorded a nega-
tive growth of 0.8% in utilization. With regard to OPD
claims expenditure, Ashanti region showed slowed
growth of 32.7 and 24.2% in 2013 and 2014, respectively
but the control regions exhibited different patterns. Cen-
tral region experienced negative growth of 17.9 and 8.7%
in both 2013 and 2014, respectively but the Volta region
experienced negative growth of 11.6% in 2013 and a
positive growth of 25.8% in 2014. This phenomenon sug-
gest that factors other than capitation payment policy
may have contributed to the trend observed in the
Ashanti region. Nonetheless, our findings are consistent
with findings in other studies that showed that capita-
tion payment is associated with slower growth of health
care expenditures on services that seem profitable under
fee-for-service, could contain cost of services and also
serve as critical source of income for providers [24–26].
Our findings also corroborate those of a study on capita-
tion payment for primary outpatient services in Zhuhai,
China which found a positive effect in controlling costs
of health care services [33]. In the China study, the OPD
cost increased rapidly over 2 years before the implemen-
tation of the capitation payment system but increased at
a much lower rate after the implementation, just as our
study found that capitation payment had some positive
effect in 2012 which was the first year of implementation
after which utilization and costs started to increase
again but at a slower rate; except that the capitation
system in Zhuhai-China was implemented alongside
pay-for-performance with a robust monitoring system.
This monitoring system which sought to regularly
check the behaviours of providers might have contrib-
uted to the slowed growth observed in the Chinese
study. Similarly in Ghana, clinical audit activities by
Table 3 Effect of capitation payment system on OPD utilization in Ashanti region
OPD utilization Coef. Robust
Std. Err.
t p > t [95% C.I] VIF 1/
VIFLower Upper
time 0.46 0.13 3.58 0.000 0.20 0.71 1.87 0.53
treated 0.6174967 0.15 4.09 0.000 0.32 0.92 2.00 0.50
did − 0.53 0.19 −2.71 0.007 −0.91 − 0.14 2.87 0.35
_cons 11.45 0.09 116.66 0.000 11.26 11.64
Mean VIF 2.25





VIF variance inflation factor
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the NHIA which exposes fraudulent claims by some
health care providers and the consequential court ac-
tion taken against them may have contributed to the
observed slowed growth in utilization and claims ex-
penditures. It must, however, be noted that a better
effect of the capitation payment could have been
achieved but for some design defects of the policy,
one being the implementation of the G-DRG along-
side the capitation payment at the OPD. The NHIA
designed two baskets of services for outpatient care
under the capitation payment policy; namely primary
outpatients services and “none-primary outpatients
services”. With the combination of DRG and capita-
tion payment at the general OPD, it is plausible that
potentially primary outpatient services are shifted to
the “none-primary outpatients” services and claims made
on the latter which cost the NHIA more than the actual
cost of the real services rendered. This plausible explan-
ation is based on a study that showed that capitation is as-
sociated with the shifting of potentially primary care
services to other areas of care [34]. Another possible rea-
son for the increasing outpatient services utilization cost in
the post intervention period may be the upward revision of
the per capita rate in February 2013 from $0.35 for public
facilities, $0.46 for faith-based facilities and $0.65 for pri-
vate facilities per month to $0.58, $0.79 and $0.84, respect-
ively [4]. During the revision antenatal and post-delivery
care were taken out from the basket of services under the
Table 4 Effect of capitation payment system on OPD cost in Ashanti region
OPD cost Coef. Robust
Std. Err.
t p > t [95% C.I] VIF 1/
VIFLower Upper
time 0.05 0.14 0.32 0.753 −.024 0.33 1.87 0.53
treated 0.77 0.14 5.34 0.000 0.48 1.05 2.00 0.50
did −0.19 0.21 −0.92 0.356 −0.62 0.22 2.87 0.35
_cons 13.77 0.09 147.31 0.000 13.57 13.96
Mean VIF 2.25





VIF variance inflation factor
Table 5 Predictors of outpatient utilization of health care services, 2014
Characteristic Coef. Std.
Err.
t p > t [95% C.I] VIF 1/
VIFLower Upper
Poverty incidence −0.004 .004 −0.91 0.367 −0.013 0.005 1.37 0.73
Population in poverty 0.000 0.000 1.41 0.166 −0.000 0.000 1.62 0.62
% of urban population 0.004 0.003 1.35 0.183 −0.002 .0108 1.92 0.52
CHPS compound −0.013 0.013 −0.96 0.340 −0.041 0.015 1.26 0.79
Health centre 0.013 0.016 0.81 0.425 −0.019 0.046 1.38 0.72
Clinic 0.071 0.031 2.29 0.027 0.008 0.134 1.79 0.56
Secondary hospital 0.612 0.257 2.38 0.022 0.093 1.132 1.29 0.78
_cons 11.579 0.230 50.14 0.000 11.113 12.045
Mean VIF 1.52






CHPS Community Health-Based Planning Services, VIF variance inflation factor
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capitation payment while payment for medication, which
hitherto was part of the capitated fees, was reverted to FFS
method. Thus, both ante-natal and post-delivery services
were paid by G-DRG method and medicines paid by FFS
method, thereby increasing the total cost of OPD services.
Other plausible reason for the upward trend in claims ex-
penditure is that providers could be discontent with the
new system and try to manipulate their income upwards.
This is because studies have found that although health
care providers in Ashanti region were aware of the poten-
tial advantages and positive attributes of capitation, they
perceived the capitation payment and the choice of the re-
gion for the pilot to be a politically motivated rather than
an intervention aimed at improving efficiency in health
care delivery and ensuring quality of care [8, 35]. Conse-
quently, although providers might know the advantages of
capitation payment, the negative perceptions they held
about it could pose a threat to the policy as observed by
Atuoye et al. [36]. The increase in OPD drugs cost for ex-
ample suggests that providers may have increased their
drug prescription to their patients in order to make more
money from sale of drugs to the insured. Furthermore, the
increase in IPD utilization could be an indication that
more patients are referred to a higher level of care under
the capitation payment system. In both cases reimburse-
ment for the treatment is by DRG and FFS methods, a
situation that suggests that providers receive double reim-
bursement. Besides the reasons that might have contrib-
uted to the OPD utilization and cost in the post capitation
period, this study found that availability of district hospi-
tals is a significant contributory factor. This finding is ex-
pected because of the general perception that higher level
hospitals are better equipped and tend to have more quali-
fied personnel, and therefore, become the preferred choice
of majority of insured clients as noted by Andoh-Adjei et
al. in a related study [35]. Apart from provider payment
method, utilization of health care may also be influenced
by demographic, socio-economic and other health system
factors [37]. With regard to demographic factors, the lit-
erature shows that there is no difference in utilization in
Ghana based on gender [38]. A difference was, however,
found in utilization for residents in urban areas compared
to those in rural areas. For socio-economic factors, there
is a difference in utilization of health care service for in-
come groups. Studies [38, 39] have found that in general,
the poor benefit less from the NHIS, because they are less
often insured but another study also found that the poor
who are members of the NHIS utilise services the more
[40]. In our study, we noted that factors such as urban
population and availability of district hospitals tend to
contribute to increasing utilization and cost of outpatient
services in the intervention region. One other finding
from our study, however, was that higher poverty was cor-
related with lower OPD service costs, a result that differs
from one found in literature [38]. Further studies into this
phenomenon will be helpful to policy makers in designing
interventions to address the situation.
Limitations
One major limitation of our study is that individual level
data was not available and therefore the use of the aggre-
gate level data led to a smaller sample size and larger
standard errors in the regression model. Another limita-
tion is that in the NHIS dataset, some values for
utilization and costs were missing but this was only one
type and of 1 or 2 years per district. In order to reduce the
effect, however, a scatter plot was made for that particular
district and type of utilization or costs over the entire time
period. A linear regression line with intercept and slope
was used to estimate the missing value. Another limitation
is that the capitation pilot was started in 2012 and thus,
the time period of analysis after capitation is no more than
3 years. This limitation might have contributed to the
multicollinearity and inflated standard errors in the
models. To see real long term effects, more years of ana-
lysis would be needed. These limitations notwithstanding,
since the dataset is derived from all the districts in both
the intervention and control regions, the results, as pre-
sented, provide a reasonably rapid appraisal of the capita-
tion payment policy in the pilot region and, therefore,
could serves as prospective evaluation results to guide pol-
icy makers on the way forward.
Conclusion
The study revealed that outpatient utilization and cost in-
creased in both pre and post capitation periods in the
intervention region, but the increment in the post capita-
tion period occurred at slower rate, thereby meeting the
expectation of the NHIA that capitation would reduce or
slow down utilization and related claims expenditures.
However, the observed trend in the control regions sug-
gest that factors other than capitation payment policy may
have contributed to the slowed growth in utilization and
cost in the intervention region. Health policy makers in
Ghana may, therefore, want to consider capitation a key
provider payment method for primary out-patient care in
order to control cost in health care delivery. The current
design, however, needs to be reviewed whilst education on
the potential benefits of capitation should be intensified
among stakeholders and the general public before consid-
eration is given to a nationwide roll-out.
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